Strategic interaction in the choice of work mode in the light of theory of games: a study applied to works at the University of Brasília

Abstract

The debate concerning teleworking in the public sector has been an important topic that still lacks theoretical and empirical contributions. Before the start of the world pandemic caused by Covid-19, public institutions, including the University of Brasília, were already discussing effective and appropriate ways to implement this work regime. This article aims to present the results of the simulation of the strategic interaction between civil servants and managers of the two boarders of this University concerning what would be the best working model. The analysis was made with a theoretical basis in Theory of Games, based on the adaptation of the game Prisoners' Dilemma and the construction of a pay-off matrix. The results show evidence that there is a preference of both players for semi-presential teleworking to the detriment of the other modalities presented in the game. The Nash equilibrium, adapted from the Prisoners' Dilemma, was achieved for the modalities of semi-presential teleworking and task teleworking, observing the influence of the incentives presented in the game. In the aforementioned pay-off matrix, the Nash equilibrium was obtained in the semi-presential telework strategy pair, which also coincided with Pareto's Optimal.