Political discussion and democratic stability

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21527/2317-5389.2024.23.15516

Keywords:

Freedom of speech, Political polarization, Public reason, Democratic stability

Abstract

This paper addresses the political polarization in Brazil, highlighting the practice of treating adversaries as personal enemies and the disregard for divergent ideas and democratic institutions as indicators of this reality. In light of this scenario, the papers analyses strategies to promote reconciliation and transform the political environment into a less combative space. Considering the absence of a widely shared conception of the common good, it suggests applying the concept of public reason, as developed in Rawlsian theory, as a means to achieve democratic stability and strengthen Brazilian institutions. By examining Brazilian political history, the work highlights the intermittent nature of democracy over the past century, alternating between democratic and authoritarian periods. It justifies the need for rational and dispassionate political debate to achieve democratic stability. The paper proposes the use of public reason, based on Schumpeter's concepts and Rawls' abstract ideas, as an approach to rationalize political discussion in Brazil. In conclusion, it argues that political polarization is not exclusive to recent years but a recurring theme throughout the 20th century. Highlighting the contribution of Schumpeter's and Rawls' concepts, the text emphasizes the possibility of rationalizing Brazilian political discourse through public reason, promoting democratic stability and strengthening democratic institutions without resorting to authoritarian outbursts that are detrimental to the country's development.

References

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Published

2024-06-12

How to Cite

de Lemos, F. J. R. (2024). Political discussion and democratic stability. Human Rights and Democracy Journal, 12(23), e15516. https://doi.org/10.21527/2317-5389.2024.23.15516