The principle of decisional courage in the administrative sphere – How the current model of punishing public administrators can lead to a selection of the worst?

Abstract

The present article aims to expose what would be the principle of decisional courage in the administrative sphere, based on the theory of public choice, which holds that governmental decisions are made exclusively in the best public interest. It challenges the myth of the completeness of the legal system, which suggests that administration is merely the mechanical application of the law, arguing instead that a range of both bound and discretionary possibilities exists in the making of administrative decisions. The article seeks to demonstrate that even with a multitude of regulations guiding administrative decisions, there will always be a personal discretionary space for the administrator, which we call the courage to decide. This decision must be guided by the Constitution, based on honesty and objective good faith. It should be framed by critical, bound discretion, well-grounded in legal certainty, which would grant a high level of confidence to administrative decisions. Suppressing or disregarding this margin of maneuver for the administrator would lead to a lack of decisions or even adverse selection of managers, selecting only those willing to take the risk of deciding. This fear-driven policy would lead to a “pen blackout”, where managers would avoid making decisions. The research methodology applied was bibliographic and documentary, and it found that courage has guided decision-making within public administration, where the manager assumes personal risk for the decision and commits to defending it in the event of any challenge.